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A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor”
wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies resource-
limited interdiction actions that maximally delay completion time of the proliferator’s weapons project, given that the
proliferator will observe any such actions and adjust his plans to minimize that time. The model incorporates a detailed
project-management (critical path method) submodel, and standard optimization software solves the model in a few minutes
on a personal computer. We exploit off-the-shelf project-management software to manage a database, control the optimiza-
tion, and display results. Using a range of levels for interdiction effort, we analyze a published case study that models three
alternate uranium-enrichment technologies. The task of “cascade loading” appears in all technologies and turns out to be
an inherent fragility for the proliferator at all levels of interdiction effort. Such insights enable policy makers to quantify
the effects of interdiction options at their disposal, be they diplomatic, economic, or military.
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From this session interdict, every fowl of tyrant wing.
Shakespeare, The Phoenix and the Turtle
1. Introduction
Sixty years after the United States detonated the first
nuclear weapon, preventing the proliferation of such
weapons is an international priority. One hundred eighty-
eight nations have ratified the 1968 Treaty on the Non-pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), more than any other
international arms-control agreement (IAEA 1970). Despite
this fact, some nonsignatories, and even some signatories,
of the NPT are currently developing nuclear weapons or
are suspected of developing nuclear weapons covertly, e.g.,
Iran and Syria. The international community is seeking
diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military means
to halt or at least hinder such development. This paper
describes and demonstrates a new bilevel mathematical pro-
gramming model that can help identify the most effective
means to accomplish this task.
Production of nuclear weapons attracts intense global
scrutiny. Because of this, and because of current NPT
safeguards such as on-demand compliance inspections of
civilian power reactors (IAEA 1970, Article III), any new
proliferator would almost certainly run a covert production
program. Outside discovery of such a program, or project,
would depend on intelligence gathering or on a public
announcement by the proliferator intended to intimidate
other nations into political or economic concessions.
Upon learning of the probable existence of a weapons
project, we would likely seek diplomatic means to halt it.
Because diplomacy may take months or years to succeed,
we can try to delay the project’s completion through actions
less severe than war such as embargoes on key materials
and economic sanctions. The techniques described in this
paper can help quantify the effects that such actions would
have on the project. They also apply to more severe actions,
such as the sabotage or bombing of key facilities, should
such become necessary.
A task (also called an “activity” in the literature) repre-
sents a well-defined step in a project that duplicates no effort
with any other step. With exceptions that arise because of
“alternate technologies,” described later, all tasks that define
a project must be completed to complete the project. For
example, “acquire metallurgical furnace” is a necessary step
in building an enriched-uranium weapon, and it does not
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Month –1 Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6
Task 2
Task 5
Notes. This Microsoft Project display shows a project with standard precedence relationships between tasks, but with a one-week lag in each case. Each
task on the critical path (Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6) has a normal duration of four weeks and an interdiction delay of two weeks. Task 5, not on the critical
path, has normal duration of 12 weeks, interdiction delay of six weeks, and slack of two weeks (indicated by the dark narrow bar). Interdicting any single
critical task delays overall project completion time by two weeks, but interdicting Task 5 delays the overall completion time by four weeks.
tank” or “fabricate uranium components”; however, com-
pletion of the last task may depend on the prior completion
of “acquire metallurgical furnace,” whereas the completion
of “acquire nitric acid storage tank” may not.
An interdiction of a task represents an action that delays
the completion of that task by a prespecified length of
time. For example, interdiction of the “acquire metallurgi-
cal furnace” task could be achieved through an international
agreement that hinders the purchase of any metallurgical
furnace that could be used in weapons production; it could
be achieved by a military strike that destroys that furnace
so that another must be acquired, or it could be achieved
through subtle acts of sabotage.
Using a set of task interdictions that is limited by “inter-
diction resources,” such as money, labor, and diplomatic
goodwill, we seek to maximally delay the completion of
a proliferator’s weapons project. We will plan these inter-
dictions by formulating and solving a special, max-min
“project-interdiction model.” A project-management sub-
model (Malcolm et al. 1959, Kelley 1961) forms the “min”
part of the interdiction model; this submodel integrates all
of the tasks necessary to produce a small batch of gun-
type, enriched-uranium weapons in the minimum amount
of time (Harney et al. 2006). Integer programming con-
structs surround the submodel to enable maximization of
that minimum through resource-limited interdiction. (In the
remainder of the paper, we assume the reader’s familiarity
with standard project-management concepts such as “prece-
dence relationship,” “critical path,” and “slack.” Texts such
as Moder et al. 1983 describe these concepts.)
Does optimal project interdiction warrant a formal
model? Critical tasks, i.e., tasks on the project’s critical
path, seem like the obvious targets for interdiction. In fact,
military planners to whom we present this problem typ-
ically assume that the optimal interdiction plan involves
critical tasks with the longest interdiction delays. But,
as Figure 1 shows, a noncritical task with sufficiently large
delay can make a better target than any critical task. Indeed,
the combinatorial nature of this problem makes a formal
model imperative (Brown et al. 2005).
Reed (1994) is the first to suggest a project-interdiction
model for optimal disruption of a nuclear-weapons project.
He does not model the proliferator’s full range of options,
however, overlooking the proliferator’s ability to use differ-
ent methods to enrich uranium (“alternate technologies”)
and the ability to expedite project completion by apply-
ing extra resources to certain tasks (“crashing the project”).
Brown et al. (2005) investigate the complexity of various
project-interdiction models and show that even a simpler
version of the model described in the current paper is
NP-hard. In fact, they point out that this problem may not
even belong to the problem class NP because simply eval-
uating the objective function for a fixed interdiction plan
requires the solution of an NP-hard problem.
The inherent complexity of a nuclear-weapons project
adds to the complexity of our interdiction problem. Accord-
ingly, we have developed a complete decision-support sys-
tem that integrates thousands of project details that cover
physics, chemistry, industrial engineering, and materials
science, as well as data on the proliferator’s ability to mar-
shal personnel and resources to achieve his goal. This sys-
tem also manages the data pertaining to interdiction options
and serves as the interface among the analyst, database,
model, and optimizer. End-users, i.e., policy-makers, can
use this system to display, and to compare quantitatively,
the combined effects that various interdiction plans will
have on a nuclear-weapons project.
2. Managing a Nuclear-Weapons Project
The proliferator will need to commit a great deal of mate-
rial, labor, and technology to his nuclear-weapons project.
Managing such a complex and expensive project will entail
detailed, centralized coordination, especially if the project
is to remain covert. Since the late 1950s, government and
industry have widely employed mathematical techniques
for managing complex projects. The original, simple mod-
els of the program evaluation review technique (PERT; see
Malcolm et al. 1959) and the critical path method (CPM;
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incorporate a variety of situations that arise in different
types of projects. The proliferator will surely employ such
techniques.
Project-management models are universally represented
as networks (e.g., Moder et al. 1983, Chapter 1). In such
representations, the additive length of the longest path
through the network, i.e., the critical path, defines the over-
all duration of the project. (Actually, more than one critical
path may exist.) The proliferator wants to minimize the
completion time of his weapons project by reducing the
duration of critical tasks, i.e., tasks on a critical path and
tasks that end up on a newly created critical path as the
durations of other tasks are reduced. While engaged in the
project, the proliferator may also be able to choose among
several alternate technologies to reach certain intermediate
project objectives, or “milestone events.” Modeling such
alternatives is crucial because the proliferator will probably
not broadcast his technological intentions, and he is free to
change technologies in response to our actions.
The proliferator’s problem can be represented as a classic
project network with the following embellishments:
(1) Completion of any task in a “normal” amount of
time consumes a fixed amount of one or more nonrenew-
able resources (Malcolm et al. 1959).
(2) The duration of an individual task may be expedited,
i.e., shortened, by allocation of additional quantities of the
required resources. The project is “crashed” when its tasks
are expedited; see Kelley (1961) and his references, and
see Charnes and Cooper (1962). We assume a linear rela-
tionship between the amounts of additional resources pro-
vided and a task’s expedited duration, but a lower limit on
that duration applies no matter the amount of additional
resources allocated to it.
(3) Crashing is limited by the availability of each re-
source and by an overall monetary budget.
(4) Certain milestones may be achieved via alternate
courses of action. When one alternative is chosen, the tasks
in the other alternative(s) need not be completed. Alter-
nate courses of action diverge at decision nodes, and a
CPM model that includes one or more such nodes is called
a decision-CPM model (Crowston and Thompson 1967).
In Harney et al. (2006) and in this paper, a single decision
node selects one of three uranium-enrichment technologies:
gas diffusion, gas centrifuge, or aerodynamic.
(5) Standard finish-to-start (FS) precedence relationships
between pairs of tasks are generalized to include start-
to-start (SS), finish-to-finish (FF), or start-to-finish (SF).
A finite lag time may be associated with each precedence
constraint (e.g., Moder et al. 1983, Chapter 2); negative
lags represent lead times.
3. Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project
We henceforth use the term interdictor to refer to the entity
(e.g., nation, group of nations) trying to delay the pro-
liferator’s project. The interdictor may exert interdiction
effort against tasks in various ways but will be limited by
any combination of a monetary budget, a weapons budget,
diplomatic constraints, constraints on environmental dam-
age, or constraints on economic consequences. We model
the interdiction of the proliferator’s project as a max-
min problem (Danskin 1967). Our max-min problem is an
instance of the bilevel programming model described by
Bard (1982) and is an instance of a two-stage Stackelberg
game, as explained by Israeli and Wood (2002). See also
Brown et al. (2006) and that paper’s references. The inter-
dictor will first choose a task or set of tasks to interdict that
maximizes the length of the resulting critical path. Then,
after observing the interdiction plan, the proliferator will
choose an enrichment technology to implement and tasks to
expedite that minimize his overall project completion time.
In the real world, the interdictor could: interdict some
tasks; observe the proliferator’s response; interdict addi-
tional tasks, later, as the project proceeds; observe the pro-
liferator’s response; and so on. However, the two-stage
model is solvable—a multistage model might not be—and
it provides a valid lower bound on the interdictor’s ability
to delay the project. That is, the two-stage model is con-
servative. Of course, if the interdictor does decide to hold
back some interdiction effort for later use, he can use the
same model, over a rolling horizon, to suggest a sequence
of interdictions using unexpended resources. The interdic-
tor can do no worse with this strategy than he would by
implementing the plan suggested by the two-stage model.
For ease of explanation, we make the following simpli-
fying assumptions when modeling interdictions. Possible
extensions, in parentheses, follow each assumption.
(1) Interdicting a task delays its completion by a con-
stant amount. (This extends easily to discrete levels of delay
that depend on level of interdiction effort.)
(2) All interdictions take place before the project begins.
(The interdiction of a partially completed project can also
be modeled. If interdicted, a partially completed task would
just be delayed, but a fully completed task might need
to be restarted. For example, if a piece of hardware were
destroyed, it would need to be reconstructed or reacquired.
All of the successors of such a task would probably be
halted until that task is “recompleted,” or we might require
them to be restarted from scratch. Or, an alternate technol-
ogy would need to be adopted.)
(3) Interdiction plans are limited by one or more
“interdiction-budget constraints.” These constraints may
represent various limits on interdiction resources, physical
or diplomatic (e.g., money, number of military actions, num-
ber of embargoes). (Logical constraints are easy to incor-
porate: for example, “If task i is interdicted, task j must
not be.”)
4. Case Study
The project-interdiction model will be easier to understand
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study, we suspect that a rogue nation is developing a fis-
sion weapon. The basics of designing such a weapon are
now well known and publicly available. Indeed, many of
the details from the early weapons programs in the United
States and elsewhere have been declassified and appear in
the open literature (e.g., FAS 1998). Consequently, the key
to developing a weapon will be to obtain the key raw mate-
rial, viz., weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. The prolif-
erator cannot buy these materials on the open market given
current international controls, so he will need to make sub-
stantial investments in industrial infrastructure and develop
his own, domestic production capability. (For context, see
Spears 2001, which traces the life cycle of nuclear materi-
als from raw ore to waste disposal.)
4.1. Case-Study Assumptions
We postulate the proliferator as a medium-sized developing
country that:
• Operates several commercial nuclear reactors to gen-
erate electric power;
• Has a population that is generally well educated by
several modern research universities;
• Has a modern chemical industry (even though many
other industries may be underdeveloped by Western
standards);
• Has substantial reserves of uranium ore; and
• Is a well-established producer of concentrated uranium
ore called “yellowcake” (for the country’s own consump-
tion and for the international market).
Furthermore,
• The proliferator has ratified the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT); and
• All safeguards established by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) are in place. (The United Nations
charters IAEA to ensure that signatories of the NPT use
nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. IAEA forges
comprehensive safeguard agreements, negotiates additional
protocols for locating and rationalizing the presence of
any quantity of nuclear material, encourages state systems
to account for and control nuclear material, and employs
remote sensing to detect undeclared nuclear activities; see
IAEA 2005, pp. 67–71.)
The proliferator seeks his own nuclear weapons to
counter growing threats from neighboring countries and to
gain credibility on the international stage as a key regional
player. The proliferator’s military and political advisers
have come to the consensus that a total nuclear arsenal of
several dozen weapons will achieve these goals.
The proliferator’s economy depends heavily on nuclear
power generation, and this dependence will only grow over
time. The proliferator will not jeopardize this economic
resource by openly violating the NPT, so he must oper-
ate a covert nuclear-weapons program. To remain covert,
the program must operate independent of the prolifera-
tor’s existing nuclear facilities, which are monitored by the
IAEA. (History shows that most nations seeking nuclear
weapons establish separate military programs, rather than
divert enriched nuclear material from their safeguarded
civilian facilities; see NERAC 2001.) Even if discovered,
continued covert development lends itself to official denials
and obfuscation. That will help the proliferator avoid quick
reprisals from the international community and enable him
to reach the ultimate goal of a nuclear arsenal.
Because NPT safeguards do not pertain to uranium
mining and yellowcake production (U.S. Congress OTA
1993, p. 137), the surest path to a nuclear-weapons program
leads through the development of a uranium-enrichment
capability fed by existing yellowcake production; produc-
ing and using the alternative bomb-making material, plu-
tonium, would be more difficult (e.g., EPA 2007). Highly
enriched uranium (HEU) can be used in a gun-type or
implosion-type fission weapon, but it can also fuel the
proliferator’s commercial reactors. Thus, if the prolifera-
tor must abandon his weapons program for any reason, he
knows that no HEU he has time to produce will go to waste.
Given the proliferator’s goal of completing a first weapon
as soon as possible, we assume that he will pursue a gun-
type weapon, the same design used in the “Little Boy”
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945. That design is
simple but reliable: Little Boy was crude, but its designers
were so confident in its construction that Hiroshima was its
first full-scale test (Rhodes 1995, pp. 17–18).
The proliferator can hide his nuclear research-and-
production facilities in existing industrial parks, where they
should escape notice because of the concomitant growth of
legitimate industry.
4.2. Case-Study Data
To reduce the chance of detection while still achieving suf-
ficient capacity to meet the arsenal goal in just a few years,
the proliferator will design production facilities to produce
six weapons per year. This goal requires an annual output
of 250 kilograms of HEU, which requires an annual input
of approximately 68 metric tons of yellowcake (Harney
et al. 2006). Because IAEA safeguards for yellowcake
cover only imports and exports, covert diversion of this
relatively small quantity from the existing production facil-
ities should be easy: 5.6 metric tons per month suffices,
and 5.6 tons of yellowcake will fit on a small truck.
Designing a nuclear weapon and constructing and oper-
ating the sophisticated support facilities required to build
six weapons per year make for a complicated project. Nec-
essary achievements include:
• Covert diversion of 68 metric tons of yellowcake
annually;
• Production of enrichment-plant feed material (uranium
hexafluoride, UF6) from yellowcake;• Uranium enrichment;
• Conversion of highly enriched UF6 to uranium metal;
and
• Design and construction of the actual weapons.
Harney et al. (2006) assess these requirements and model
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Table 1. Cost and availability of resources in the case
study.
Unit cost Total units
Resource Units ($/unit) available
Energy MWhr 100 3100000
Materials $k 1000 190000
Professional labor Mmo 48000 10000
Skilled labor Mmo 24000 10000
Unskilled labor Mmo 6000 6000
Notes. The project is further constrained by a budget of $380 million.
Costs are fictitious.
MWhr, megawatt-hours; $k, thousands of dollars; Mmo, man-
months.
containing approximately 200 nodes (tasks) and 600 arcs
(direct precedence relationships between tasks). The pro-
liferator manages five nonrenewable resources: energy,
materials, professional labor (e.g., scientists, engineers),
skilled labor (e.g., machinists, electronics technicians), and
unskilled labor. Table 1 summarizes the costs and availabil-
ity of these resources. Figure 2 displays a small part of the
complete Gantt chart associated with one candidate project
plan.
Our case study employs only mild, nonmilitary inter-
dictions of tasks: we assume that the interdictor prefers
to avoid the casus belli that, say, strategic strikes would
imply. Table 2 shows how to interpret each task’s “index”
in Harney et al. (2006), to recover data that define the cost
to interdict the task and the delay resulting from interdic-
tion. Our computational examples also place limits on the
total number of tasks interdicted.
5. A Model to Maximally Delay
a Project: DCPMI
Here, we formulate a model to interdict a project that is
defined using generalized decision-CPM constructs. This
interdiction model, denoted DCPMI, will identify inter-
diction actions, subject to interdiction-resource constraints,
Figure 2. Portion of a Gantt chart, produced with Microsoft Project™, that displays seven of 196 tasks in the case-study
project.
Notes. “(Acquire) Diffusion barriers” constitutes one task in the gas diffusion uranium-enrichment process; it is represented by a two-part horizontal bar.
The left part, with diagonal hashing, represents the task’s implemented length of 44.12 weeks, as labeled. The direction of the hashing, from top-left to
bottom-right, indicates that the task is critical. The second part of the bar, on the right and with vertical hashing, indicates that the task has been expedited
by the length of the hashed extension (an unlabeled 3.88 weeks). “(Acquire) Pumps and piping” is another task represented by a two-part bar. The left
part, with top-right to bottom-left diagonal hashing, denotes a noncritical task; the right part (a thick line) indicates the amount of slack in this task
(20.12 weeks, unlabeled), which represents the delay that the task can incur before becoming critical. The figure also shows an “FF” relationship between
“Cascade loading” and “Production of enriched and depleted material.”
Table 2. Interdiction delay and cost indexing for tasks
in Harney et al. (2006).
Delay index A B C D E F G H I J K L
Delay (months) 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 36 40 48 56 60
Cost index a b c d
Cost ($M) 0.20 0.45 1.20 1.70
Notes. Each uppercase letter code denotes an interdiction delay in
months, and each lowercase letter codes an interdiction cost in mil-
lions of dollars. For example, the index “Fa” for task 131, “(Acquire)
Hafnia crucibles,” indicates that interdicting this task would inflict a
24-month delay on the task and would cost the interdictor 0.20 mil-
lion dollars. Costs are fictitious.
that maximally delay a proliferator’s nuclear-weapons
project, given that the proliferator will observe any such
actions and adjust his plans (i.e., choice of enrichment
technology and task-expediting efforts) to minimize the
project’s completion time. We use an activity-on-node for-
mulation of the project network in which a node repre-
sents a project task and an arc represents the partial order
between a predecessor- and successor-task pair (e.g., Ahuja
et al. 1993, pp. 732–734). For simplicity of exposition,
we (a) make assumptions for the interdictor as described
in §3 and (b) measure the consumption of each task-
expediting resource r , whether monetary or physical, in
units called “r-dollars.”
Model: Delaying a Decision-CPM Project, DCPMI
Indices and Index Sets [cardinality]
i j ∈N tasks (nodes) [∼200].
start, end⊂N project start and end tasks, respectively.
i j	 ∈A precedence relationships: task i directly
precedes task j (arcs) [∼600].
AFS ⊆A i j	 ∈ AFS if task i must finish before
task j can start.
AFF ⊆A i j	 ∈ AFF if task i must finish before
task j can finish.
ASF ⊆A i j	 ∈ ASF if task i must start before
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ASS ⊆A i j	 ∈ ASS if task i must start before
task j can start (AFSAFFASF, and ASS
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
subsets of A).
p ∈ P decision outcomes (in our example, the
three enrichment technologies) [3].
N0 ⊆N tasks not associated with any decision (in
all cases, start, end⊂N0).
Np ⊂N all tasks associated with decision out-
come p ∈ P (N0 and the sets Np, ∀p ∈ P ,
form a partition of N ).
ND ⊂N decision nodes.
r ∈R nonrenewable project resources (for the
proliferator) [5].
r ′ ∈R′ nonrenewable interdiction resources (for
the interdictor) [2].
Data [units]
d¯i di duration of task i ∈ N with, respectively, no
expediting effort and maximum expediting effort
[weeks]. Note: d¯i = di ≡ 0 for i ∈ start, end.
lagij time lag for a precedence constraint indexed by
i j	 ∈A [weeks].
f ′ij 1 if i j	 ∈AFF∪AFS, else 0. Indicates that task i’s
duration affects the start of task j .
f ′′ij 1 if i j	 ∈AFF∪ASF, else 0. Indicates that task j’s
duration affects task i’s start.
cir the cost, in terms of project resource r ∈ R, to
complete task i ∈ N with no expediting effort
[r-dollars].
air the per-week cost, in terms of project resource
r ∈R, for expediting task i ∈N [r-dollars/week].
br total budget for decision-and-expediting resource
r ∈R [r-dollars].
delayi amount that task i ∈ N is delayed if interdicted
[weeks].
dmax a large number used to relax precedence constraints
for tasks that are not actually completed (e.g.,
dmax = maxi∈N d¯i + delayi	 + maxi j	∈A lagij )
[weeks].
vir ′ cost to interdict task i ∈N in terms of interdiction
resource r ′ ∈R′ [r ′-dollars].
wr ′ total budget for interdiction resource r
′ ∈ R′
[r ′-dollars].
Variables [units if applicable]
Xi 1 if task i ∈N is interdicted, 0 otherwise (vector X is
the “interdiction plan”).
Di 1 if task i ∈N is completed, 0 otherwise (vector D is
the “decision plan”).
Ei amount task i ∈N is expedited (vector E is the “expe-
diting plan”) [weeks].










where the set  is defined by∑
i∈N0∪Np
vir ′Xi wr ′ ∀ r ′ ∈R′ p ∈ P (2)
Xi ∈ 01 ∀ i ∈N (3)
and the set X	 is defined by
Sj − Si  f ′ij d¯i−Ei+ delayiXi	− f ′′ij d¯j −Ej + delayjXj	





airEi  br ∀ r ∈R (5)
Dj Di ∀ i j	 ∈A  i ND (6)
Di =
∑
j  i j	∈A
Dj ∀ i ∈ND (7)
Di ≡ 1 ∀ i ∈N0 (8)
0Ei  d¯i− di ∀ i ∈N (9)
Di ∈ 01 ∀ i ∈N\N0 (10)
Si  0 ∀ i ∈N (11)
Sstart ≡ 0 (12)
Discussion
The objective function (1) represents the interdictor’s desire
to chose an interdiction plan X that increases individual
task durations and thereby maximizes the project’s over-
all completion time; simultaneously, it also represents the
proliferator’s desire to minimize that time by choosing
which tasks to complete in a decision plan D, and by
choosing which tasks to expedite with expediting plan E,
and by solving for earliest start times S. The interdic-
tor’s actions are restricted to the set , as defined by con-
straints (2)–(3), and for any specific interdiction plan X
chosen by the interdictor—the reader should view X as data
now—the proliferator’s resulting decisions are restricted to
the set X	, as defined by constraints (4)–(12).
Each constraint (2) asserts a budget restriction for one of
the decisions the proliferator can make: the total expendi-
ture of budget resource r ′ cannot exceed wr ′ for any realiza-
tion of the proliferator’s decision plan. Specifically, for each
enrichment technology a separate set of budget constraints
limits overall interdiction expenditures for nonenrichment
tasks together with the tasks for that specific enrichment
technology. For example, given a single “budget” of one
interdiction, the interdictor could attack one task that is
not part of any specific enrichment technology, or he could
interdict three tasks, one from each technology. This mod-
eling assumption allows the interdictor to develop interdic-
tion plans that are contingent upon the proliferator’s choice
of technology but not upon his application of expediting
resources. This prevents situations in which the interdictor
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and the proliferator simply chooses a different technology
and avoids interdiction altogether. We are therefore assum-
ing that, by the time enrichment-specific tasks must be
interdicted, the interdictor will have become aware of the
proliferator’s choice of technology and will interdict only
the relevant tasks.
We express constraints (4) in a nonstandard fashion
to emphasize the roles played by f ′ij and f
′′
ij . Each such
constraint enforces a lower limit on the difference between
the earliest start time of a task j and one of its predecessor
tasks i, based on the nature of the precedence relationship
between i and j . The term d¯i−Ei+ delayiXi	 is included
if that precedence relationship relates to the finish time of
task i, and the term −d¯j − Ej + delayjXj	 is included if
that precedence relationship relates to the finish time of
task j . Each of these constraints also accounts for the lag
between tasks i and j , specified by lagij .
Constraints (5) enforce monetary and/or physical re-
source limitations on the proliferator’s actions. Con-
straints (6) require the completion of each successor of any
completed task, except for certain successors of the decision
node. Constraints (7) require that exactly one of the suc-
cessors of the (single) decision node be completed, thereby
guaranteeing the selection of exactly one enrichment tech-
nology. Constraints (8) require the completion of all non-
decision tasks. Constraints (9) limit the amount by which
each task i can be expedited.
5.1. EMIN: Optimal Decision-CPM
After Interdiction
For a fixed interdiction plan X ∈, we denote the resulting




and with constraints defined by (4)–(12). Our overall goal




In theory, we could solve (14) by enumerating the finite
set of interdiction plans X ∈, solving EMINX	 for each,
and choosing the plan that results in the largest value of
ZminX	. In practice,  is too large to enumerate, so we
solve (14) with the decomposition algorithm described
immediately below.
5.2. DMAX: How to Optimally Delay a Project with
a Known Decision-and-Expediting Plan
Our procedure for solving DCPMI requires an upper
bound on the optimal objective value, i.e., an optimistic
value on how long we can expect to delay the prolifer-
ator. Accordingly, we formulate an optimization model,
denoted DMAXD E	, that determines an optimal interdic-
tion of any fixed decision-and-expediting plan D E	; we
assume that this plan always satisfies (4)–(12). A solution
to this model yields the upper bound we seek because the
proliferator’s response is restricted to D E	.
We adopt the dual, longest-path point of view in this
formulation (e.g., Ahuja et al. 1993, pp. 733–734): the
model routes one unit of “flow” along a single, longest path
through the activity-on-node network. However, we must
define several sets of auxiliary binary variables, and asso-
ciated constraints, to “cost out” that path correctly.
Model DMAXD E: Delaying a Project Having
a Fixed Decision-and-Expediting Plan
Only constructs not defined earlier are listed here.
Indices and Index Sets
N i ∈N  Di = 1 (Note: start, end⊂ N ).
Variables [units]
Z duration of the project [weeks].
Yij 1 if the precedence relationship i j	 is on the critical
path, 0 otherwise.
Wi 1 if task i is on the critical path and is not interdicted,
0 otherwise.
W ′i 1 if task i is on the critical path and is interdicted,
0 otherwise.
W ′′i 1 if task i is on the critical path and its duration must











d¯i− Ei+ delayi	W ′i
−∑
i∈ N
d¯i− Ei	W ′′i +
∑
i j	∈A  i j∈ N
lagijYij  (16)
∑
j∈ N  i j	∈A
Yij −
∑





+1 for i= start





j∈ N  i j	∈AFS∪AFF
Yij ∀ i ∈ N\end (18)
Wi+W ′i 
∑
j∈ N j i	∈AFS∪ASS
Yji ∀ i∈ N\start (19)
∑
j∈ N  j i	∈ASF∪AFF
Yji+
∑
j∈ N  i j	∈ASS∪ASF
Yij  1+W ′′i
∀ i ∈ N\start, end (20)
Wi  1−Xi ∀ i ∈ N\start, end (21)
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∑
i∈ N
vir ′Xi wr ′ ∀ r ′ ∈R′ (23)
Xi ≡ 0 ∀ i ∈ND ∪ start, end (24)
Wstart ≡Wend ≡ 1 (25)
all variables ∈ 01 except Z (26)
Discussion
The objective function (15) represents the overall project
duration Z. We use a nonstandard formulation to repre-
sent the calculation of this objective in constraint (16) to
motivate and simplify the description of the decomposition
algorithm that follows. Constraint (16) bounds the project
duration by the sum of the task durations and the appro-
priate lag times along a critical path resulting from the
fixed decision-and-expediting plan D E	. A task’s duration
depends on whether or not it has been interdicted, and, based
on interactions between the various precedence relations,
this task’s duration is added to the overall project duration,
is subtracted from it, or has no influence. The upper bound
implied by the right-hand side of (16) is valid because it
computes the length of a critical path for any interdiction
plan under the restrictive assumption that the proliferator
cannot change his decision-and-expediting plan.
Flow-balance constraints for this activity-on-node net-
work appear in (17). These ensure the consistent routing
of a single unit of “critical flow” through the network,
from the artificial start task to the artificial end task. Con-
straints (18) and (19) determine whether a task’s duration
can add to the critical path’s length; the task’s duration can
be the uninterdicted, expedited duration or the interdicted,
expedited duration. The variable Wi is 1 when (a) task i is
on the critical path, (b) task i’s duration adds to the length
of the critical path, and (c) task i is not interdicted; Wi is
0 otherwise. The variable W ′i is 1 when (a) task i is on the
critical path, (b) task i’s duration adds to the length of the
critical path, and (c) task i is interdicted; W ′i is 0 otherwise.
Note that task i’s duration adds to the critical-path length
only if there exists a critical arc i j	 ∈ AFS ∪ AFF and a
critical arc j ′ i	 ∈AFS ∪ASS.
Constraints (20) determine whether a particular task on
the critical path has predecessor and successor relationships
along that path that require its duration be subtracted from
the overall project duration: the variable W ′′i is 1 if and
only if task i is on the critical path, and this task’s duration
subtracts from the length of the critical path. This unusual
situation occurs when (a) a sequence of tasks h-i-j lies on
the critical path, (b) either the start or the finish time of
task h places a lower bound on the finish time of task i, and
(c) the start time of task i places a lower bound on the start
or finish time of task j . In realistic situations, other tasks
would constrain the start time and the end time of a task i,
and it is unlikely that the sequence of three tasks required
for this unusual situation would be critical simultaneously.
Constraints (17)–(25) are defined only with respect to
tasks that are completed by the proliferator, i.e., tasks i ∈ N .
Therefore, no restrictions apply to W, W′, W′′, or Y
for tasks involved in the technologies not chosen by the
proliferator.
Constraints (21) and (22) determine whether the inter-
dicted or uninterdicted version of a task can appear on the
critical path. Constraints (23) enforce various interdiction-
resource constraints on the interdictor, although they could
also represent logical constraints such as “Do not place
embargoes on more than two of the proliferator’s critical
resources,” or “If task i1 is interdicted, then task i2 must
not be.” Constraints (24) preclude interdiction of the arti-
ficial start and end nodes and of any decision node. Con-
straints (25) maintain consistency of the definition of Wi:
the artificial start and end nodes always appear on the crit-
ical path.
5.3. Algorithm MAXMIN
We now present a decomposition algorithm, denoted
MAXMIN, to solve (14). As a generalization of Benders
decomposition (Benders 1962), MAXMIN alternates
between (a) a master problem that identifies an optimal
interdiction plan for a fixed decision-and-expediting plan
and (b) a subproblem that, for a fixed interdiction plan,
chooses an optimal combination of enrichment technology
and expediting plan for the weapons program. MAXMIN
does look similar to the Benders-decomposition algorithm
used by Israeli and Wood (2002) to identify interdictions
in a road network that maximize the length of the shortest
s-t path. However, unlike standard Benders decomposition,
MAXMIN’s subproblem is a difficult integer program, not
a linear program (and not an integer program that solves
directly through its linear programming relaxation, as with
a shortest-path model). Furthermore, the master problem
exploits a nominally nonconvergent bound, which we aug-
ment with special constraints to guarantee the algorithm’s
convergence.
At iteration K of MAXMIN, a set of decision-and-
expediting plans Dk Ek	, k = 1    K, will have been
generated from the subproblem. The optimal objective to
DMAXDK EK	 would provide a valid upper bound on Z∗
at that point. However, to obtain a bound that can improve
from iteration to iteration, MAXMIN solves a master prob-
lem that defines a restriction of DMAXDK EK	 by replac-




i  Dki =1
d¯i− Eki 	Wi+
∑
i  Dki =1
d¯i− Eki + delayi	W ′i
− ∑
i  Dki =1
d¯i− Eki 	W ′′i +
∑
i j	∈A  Dki =Dkj=1
lagijYij
for k= 1    K (27)
We refer to constraints (27) as “cuts” because they are anal-
ogous to Benders cuts; we denote the master problem that
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The optimal objective value to DMAXK provides a valid
upper bound on Z∗ because each cut in (27) is valid for
any interdiction: (a) Either the cut at iteration k was gen-
erated by the same decision plan as the “active” technol-
ogy for this instance of the master problem (that is, for
Dk = DK), and that cut’s validity follows from the argu-
ments used to justify DMAXD E	, or (b) a different tech-
nology generated that cut, in which case the cut is relaxed.
In the latter case, constraints (17)–(20) do not restrict vari-
ables Wi, W
′
i , and W
′′
i , so that the corresponding cut in (27)
is relaxed.
Unfortunately, the upper bound from DMAXK need not
converge to Z∗. This is true because even if DMAXK cov-
ered all decision plans, its solution would find the best
interdiction plan assuming that the interdictor could dic-
tate the proliferator’s decision plan. To alleviate this dif-
ficulty, we simply add what we call solution-elimination
constraints (SECs). (Brown et al. 1997 discuss SECs with-
out naming them; Israeli and Wood 2002 define a general-
ization of SECs, called “super-valid inequalities,” but use
those inequalities to speed convergence of a decomposi-
tion algorithm, not to ensure its convergence.) The follow-
ing SECs prohibit any interdiction plan Xk, k = 1    K,
from being repeated but allow all others:
∑
i  Xki =0
Xi+
∑
i  Xki =1
1−Xi	 1 k= 1    K (28)
The upper bound provided by DMAXK with con-
straints (28) may not be valid if some Xk is actually opti-
mal, but that bound can drop below Z∗ only if an optimal
solution is in hand, at which point the validity of the bound
is moot. Step 7 in the algorithm accommodates this situa-
tion. A full description of the algorithm follows.
Algorithm MAXMIN
Input: Data for DCPMI, and optimality tolerance $ 0;
Output: $-optimal interdiction plan X∗, and provable
optimality gap;
Note: ZminXK	 denotes the optimal objective value
from EMIN(XK	, and ZKmax denotes the optimal objective
value from DMAXK with SECs added.
(1) Initialize upper bound ZUB ← , lower bound
ZLB← 0, define the incumbent, null interdiction plan X∗ ←X1 ← 0 as the best found so far, and set iteration counter
K← 1;
(2) Subproblem: Attempt to solve EMINXK	 to deter-
mine the proliferator’s optimal decision-and-expediting plan
DK EK	 given XK ; the bound on the associated project
length is ZminXK	;
(3) If (EMINXK	 is infeasible) set ZLB← and go to
End;
/∗ Above, if the subproblem is infeasible, the proliferator
cannot afford to complete the interdicted project. ∗/
(4) If ZminXK	 > ZLB	 set ZLB←ZminXK	 and record
improved incumbent interdiction plan X∗ ← XK ;
(5) If (ZUB−ZLB  $	 go to End;
(6) Append a new instance of cuts (27) and SECs (28)
to DMAXK , and attempt to solve that master problem to
obtain the conditionally valid upper bound on the project
length, ZKmax;
/∗ The bound is valid if we have not identified the opti-
mal solution yet, and the bound’s validity is moot if we
have. ∗/
(7) If (DMAXK is infeasible) set ZUB ← ZLB and go to
End;
/∗ Above, the master problem could be infeasible
because all solutions have been eliminated by SECs. In this
case, X∗ must be optimal. ∗/
(8) If  ZKmax <ZUB	 set ZUB← ZKmax;
(9) If ZUB−ZLB  $	 go to End;
(10) Set K←K+ 1 and go to Subproblem;
(11) End: Print (X∗, “is an $-optimal solution with
objective value,” ZLB);




We have integrated the models and algorithm described
above with an off-the-shelf project-management product,
Microsoft Project 2003™ (“MS Project”; see Microsoft
2004), to manage data and to display results. We have
implemented the algorithm with the GAMS algebraic
modeling system (GAMS 2007a) using CPLEX as the opti-
mizer (GAMS 2007b). A custom interface written in VBA
(Microsoft 2003) provides the analyst with access to the
model and optimizer and connects MS Project’s functions
with GAMS.
A 2.0 GHz Dell Inspiron 6000 computer serves as our
computing platform. Each instance of MAXMIN requires
less than 20 minutes to generate (via VBA and GAMS),
to optimize (via CPLEX), and to return results to MS
Project (via GAMS and VBA). Each subproblem EMIN
comprises approximately 200 binary variables, 400 contin-
uous variables, and 1,100 constraints. The master problem
DMAXK comprises approximately 1,200 binary variables
and 1,100–1,600 constraints, depending on the number of
iterations.
7. Application and Insights
Using MAXMIN, we find the best interdiction plan for
a single set of input parameters and recover the resulting
project plan used by the proliferator after he sees that inter-
diction plan. We have found instances in which multiple
interdiction plans produce the same maximum expedited
project length. A set of such interdiction plans can be pre-
sented to policy-makers for evaluation against secondary
criteria.
Using the scenario from Harney et al. (2006) that has
unlimited resources for the proliferator and no interdic-
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Table 3. MAXMIN solves DCPMI for the case study, with zero to four interdictions and two
different decision-and-expediting budgets for the proliferator.
Proliferator’s budget= $380 million Proliferator’s budget= $480 million
Number of
interdictions ZLB ZUB Relgap (%) Iter. ZLB ZUB Relgap (%) Iter.
0 26000 26000 00 1 26000 26000 00 0
1 31600 31600 00 13 31200 31600 13 24
2 35025 3505 01 54 34000 34012 <01 5
3 35200 37431 63 500 35200 36412 34 17
4 36800 3865 50 211 36800 37650 23 488
Notes. The algorithm uses a 5% relative optimality tolerance but is limited to a maximum of 500 iterations. For each
problem, the table reports the objective value in weeks for the best solution found ZLB, the best upper bound ZUB, the
relative optimality gap (“Relgap”) established in the last iteration, and the number of iterations.
completes his project in 260 weeks, i.e., in a little over five
years. (Incidentally, the three enrichment technologies have
similar completion times when fully crashed but signifi-
cantly different costs: about 196 weeks and $108 million
for gas centrifuge, 192 weeks and $318 million for gas dif-
fusion, and 192 weeks and $258 million for aerodynamic.)
Now, suppose that (a) the proliferator plans to complete his
project as quickly as possible under the assumption that
we will not interdict his plan, (b) we, as interdictor, opti-
mally interdict assuming the proliferator will not notice our
actions, and (c) the proliferator, in fact, does not notice.
(That is, the proliferator solves EMIN0	 to obtain D E	,
and we solve DMAXD E	 and do not have to worry
about the proliferator adjusting his subsequent plans.) This
is an optimistic situation for us, but it is instructive to
analyze because it helps evaluate the importance of keep-
ing our interdiction plan secret. By interdicting the two
optimal tasks, we can extend the proliferator’s project to
356 weeks (approximately 6.8 years), which amounts to
a 37% increase. To achieve this delay, we interdict “cas-
cade loading” and “acquisition of pumps and piping” for
the production versions of the enrichment equipment.
MAXMIN then shows that, even if the proliferator is
aware of our intention to interdict his project and which
tasks we will delay, the best he can do is to complete the
project in 348 weeks (approximately 6.7 years). This is still
a 34% increase over the length of the project when we
do nothing. This significant but not huge increase results
from our modest assumptions about the achievable delays
from interdictions. Even though the proliferator knows how
the project will be interdicted and can compensate, and
even if he chooses a different enrichment technology and
completely reallocates his monetary resources, he can save
only 8 weeks of the project length we achieve by interdict-
ing with complete secrecy. Thus, we have discovered real,
unavoidable fragilities in his project.
We have also evaluated a scenario in which the pro-
liferator purchases HEU instead of producing it himself.
With a large crashing budget, the proliferator now com-
pletes the uninterdicted project in 208 weeks but requires
244 weeks with two interdictions. These results contrast
with the belief that some people may have, which is that
possessing HEU is essentially equivalent to possessing a
nuclear weapon. It is true that if the proliferator produces
his own HEU, he needs only approximately 260−192= 68
weeks to complete a weapon once the HEU is in hand. But
those 68 weeks are preceded by approximately 208− 68=
140 weeks of work on infrastructure for exploiting that
HEU, effort that goes on in parallel with its production.
(The proliferator’s ability to fabricate a potent radiological
dispersion device, i.e., a “dirty bomb,” would pose a more
immediate threat; see Magill et al. 2007.)
Table 3 illustrates the results of running MAXMIN for
various scenarios involving from zero to four interdicted
tasks, and with a decision-and-expediting budget of either
$380 million or $480 million for the proliferator. We mod-
ify the algorithm slightly by (a) adding an iteration limit
of 500 and (b) replacing the absolute optimality tolerance
of $ with a relative optimality tolerance of 5% (that is, the
algorithm terminates if 100%× ZUB−ZLB	/ZLB  5%).
The table shows that, for two interdictions, the prolif-
erator can make some modest use of an increased budget.
In both budget scenarios, the final optimality gap is less
than 1%, and we see that the proliferator can reduce his
project-completion time by approximately 10 weeks if he
has an extra $100 million at his disposal.
The algorithm achieves an optimality gap of at most
5% for all scenarios except the one with three interdic-
tions allowed and a $380 million decision-and-expediting
budget. In this case, it terminates at 500 iterations with a
6.3% optimality gap. We use this most-difficult scenario to
illustrate, in Figure 3, how MAXMIN progresses through
its iterations when faced with a challenging problem. The
figure displays lower and upper bounds on Z∗, as well as
the individual master- and subproblem-solution values, for
the first 150 iterations. At that point, the optimality gap is
6.4%, and the remaining 350 iterations improve only the
upper bound, and only fractionally.
In every variation of the case study, the cascade-loading
task in each of the alternate technologies is the most sus-
ceptible to interdiction: the three variants of this task appear
in every incumbent interdiction plan found by MAXMIN.
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Figure 3. Progress of the MAXMIN algorithm for
150 iterations, given three interdictions and a
decision-and-expediting budget of $380 mil-




















Notes. At each iteration, the lower, dashed line represents the subprob-
lem objective value; the dashed line directly above represents the global
lower bound set by the incumbent interdiction plan; the solid upper line
represents the local upper bound ZmaxD E	 obtained from each master-
problem solution; and the thicker solid line represents the global upper
bound.
8. Conclusions
This paper has presented a max-min model, denoted
DCPMI, for the optimal interdiction of a nuclear-weapons
project. “Optimal” implies that the project is maximally
delayed given limited interdiction resources. Interdictions
might involve military strikes, embargoes on key materials,
or sabotage of facilities.
At its inner level, DCPMI incorporates a detailed project-
management model, specifically, a generalized decision-
CPM model. This model shows how the nuclear-weapons
developer, or “proliferator,” could complete his weapons
project as quickly as possible by using limited resources
to complete and expedite project tasks and by using alter-
nate technologies to achieve certain intermediate goals. The
outer level of DCPMI uses interdiction resources to delay
the project’s tasks, with the goal being to maximize the pro-
liferator’s minimum project-completion time. We develop
a special decomposition algorithm to solve DCPMI for an
optimal or near-optimal interdiction plan. The algorithm
extends Benders decomposition in that (a) its subprob-
lems are difficult integer programs, not linear programs,
and (b) it uses a nominally nonconvergent master-problem
bound, which is augmented with solution-elimination con-
straints to ensure convergence.
We have developed a complete decision-support system
that implements DCPMI and its solution algorithm using
standard software. Computational results from a case study
show that optimal or near-optimal solutions can be found
for a large-scale, high-fidelity scenario in approximately
20 minutes on a personal computer. Thus, “what-if” exer-
cises can be conducted quickly.
DCPMI is flexible and can easily adapt to a number of
modeling nuances not covered in the paper. For example,
it is easy to add constraints to limit the political, environ-
mental, or economic impact of candidate interdiction plans
(Reed 1994), and DCPMI can easily incorporate multiple
types of interdiction resource and/or interdiction actions
that affect multiple tasks. DCPMI can also be adjusted to
preferentially interdict active or near-term tasks, better to
achieve immediate or near-term results. This would also
reduce the time that the proliferator has to detect inter-
dictions and to make recovery plans. The model can also
be modified to analyze a partially completed project, and
even to allow interdictions that set back such a project
by “decompleting” certain tasks. For example, a com-
pleted enrichment facility could be destroyed by a military
strike, or by sabotage, and would need to be rebuilt; see
Skroch (2004).
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